DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS 

 
Application for the Correction of 
the Coast Guard Record of: 
 
                                                                                       BCMR Docket No. 2002-165 
 
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 

 

 
 

FINAL DECISION 

 
ANDREWS, Deputy Chair: 
 
 
This proceeding was conducted under the provisions of section 1552 of title 10 
and section 425 of title 14 of the United States Code.  The application was docketed on 
September  9,  2002,  upon  the  BCMR’s receipt  of  the  applicant’s  completed  application 
and military records. 
 
 
members who were designated to serve as the Board in this case. 
 

This  final  decision,  dated  July  24,  2003,  is  signed  by  the  three  duly  appointed 

APPLICANT’S REQUEST AND ALLEGATIONS  

 
 
The applicant asked the Board to correct her record by upgrading her 1989 OTH 
discharge (“under other than honorable conditions”) to an honorable discharge by rea-
son  of  physical  disability.    She  alleged  that  her  disability,  schizophrenia,1  was 
diagnosed while she was in the service and that it caused her to commit the crimes for 
which  she  was  court-martialed.    She  alleged  that  because  of  her  mental  illness,  she 
should  have  been  fully  processed  under  the  Coast  Guard’s  Physical  Disability 
Evaluation  System  (PDES)  and  administratively  separated.    She  alleged  that  it  was 
                                                 
1 Schizophrenia is a serious organic mental disorder characterized by loss of contact with reality (psycho-
sis), hallucinations, delusions, abnormal or disorganized thinking, bizarre behavior, and great difficulty 
functioning  in  social  and  work  settings.    People  with  schizophrenia  often  have  a  blunted  or  flat  affect, 
with  poor  eye  contact,  one-  or  two-word  answers  for  questions,  lack  of  emotional  expressiveness,  and 
lack of motivation and interests.  Stressful life events or substance abuse may trigger the onset of schizo-
phrenia in biologically vulnerable individuals.  The onset may be sudden, over a period of days or weeks, 
or gradual, over a few months or years.  The peak age of onset for women is between 25 and 35 years old.  
See  American  Psychiatric  Association,  DIAGNOSTIC  AND  STATISTICAL  MANUAL  OF  MENTAL  DISORDERS, 
Fourth Edition, Test Revision (DSM-IV-TR) p. 297 et seq. (Washington, D.C., 2000). 

unjust for her to receive an OTH discharge that denies her veterans’ benefits since her 
mental illness caused her misconduct. 
 
The applicant alleged that she discovered the error in her records on August 1, 
 
2001.    She  asked  the  Board  to  find  it  in  the  interest  of  justice  to  waive  the  three-year 
statute  of  limitations  in  her  case  because  she  “did  not  know  [her]  options”  when  she 
was discharged and has been under a doctor’s care ever since.  
 
 
In support of her allegations, the applicant submitted one page of a report from a 
state Department of Mental Health dated April 17, 1974, when the applicant was eight 
years  old.    The  report  indicates  that  her  father  was  in  prison  and  that  she  was  being 
treated for “behavioral difficulties  which are exhibited by lying, stealing, unattentive-
ness in school and ‘hard-headed,’ over activity at home.”  She also submitted a report 
from her military medical record (summarized below) and a Criminal Record Check of 
county records showing that she has no criminal record from May 1988 to June 2003. 
 
 
In  addition,  the  applicant  submitted  two  reports  from  her  state’s  Division  of 
Mental Health, which show that on July 10, 2001, after having been released from five 
years’ incarceration in a women’s prison, the applicant was being treated for “Schizo-
affective Disorder, Depressed Type, which included racing thoughts, history of neuro-
negative depressive symptoms, paranoia and auditory hallucinations.”2  A week later, a 
psychiatrist noted that she had some “racing thoughts” but no “psychotic symptoma-
tology.” 
 

SUMMARY OF THE APPLICANT’S MILITARY RECORD 

 

On March 31, 1986, at the age of 20, the applicant enlisted in the Coast Guard for 
four years.  At her pre-enlistment physical examination, it was noted that she had had a 
significant head injury (cerebral contusion) in a car accident in 1984 and had been raped 
in  1985.    She  completed  boot  camp  and,  on  July  24,  1986,  was  transferred  to  a  cutter 
based in XXXXXX.  

 
In  early  September  1986,  the  applicant  was  treated  for  smoke  inhalation.    She 

stated that her trash can caught fire while she was asleep. 

 
On  September  16,  1986,  the  applicant  was  found  to  be  absent  without  leave 
(AWOL)  from  her  unit.    She  surrendered  herself  in  Baltimore  on September  21,  1986, 
and reported that she had been raped again.  She was returned to XXXXXX and evalu-
ated by a Navy psychiatrist.  The psychiatrist stated that the applicant was “alert, ori-

                                                 
2 “Schizoaffective disorder” is a psychotic disorder with many of the same symptoms as schizophrenia. It 
is distinguishable by pervasive mood symptoms, either depressed or manic. See DSM-IV-TR, p. 319 et seq. 
 

ented … [with] minimal cooperation.  Appears deliberately evasive and attempting to 
be more confused than reality, e.g. ‘I don’t remember my mother.’  No signs of delu-
sions,  racing  thoughts  or  paranoia.    Mood,  affect  mildly  depressed—admits  to  being 
AWOL and pending 2 previous rapes within the past 6 months.   Insight & judgment 
fair.  Speech slow in passive aggressive style.  ‘Atypical’ presentation for rape.  ‘Amne-
sia’ appears selective & feigned, e.g. approximate answers.” 

 
On  September  25,  1986,  the  psychiatrist  noted  that  she  seemed  quiet  and 
depressed.    She  told  him  that  her  “thoughts  surround  fears  of  sexual  assault.”    She 
denied suicidal ideations but complained of having difficulty sleeping.  The psychiatrist 
prescribed Elavil, an anti-depressant and referred her for counseling. 

 
On September 29, 1986, the applicant was admitted to a hospital, stating that she 
had overdosed on her anti-depressant medicine.  The doctor diagnosed it as a “suicidal 
gesture”  and  an  “acute  situational  reaction.”    Tests  showed  that  she  had  consumed 
alcohol and ipecac, which induces vomiting.  

 
In accordance with Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), on 
October 20, 1986, the applicant was taken to captain’s mast for non-judicial punishment 
(NJP) for her five days of AWOL in violation of Articles 86 (unauthorized absence) and 
87 (missing movement) of the UCMJ.  She was restricted to the cutter for 14 days and 
assigned two extra hours of duty per day.  On October 25, 1986, she was transferred off 
the cutter to a station in XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX. 

 
On November 5, 1986, the applicant told her counselor that she had been drink-
ing alcohol and related a history of drinking alcohol.  Her counselor told her not to as 
she was underage and should not try to escape her problems with alcohol. 

 
On November 12, 1986, the applicant threatened a female sentinel, hit her in the 
face, and threw a heavy metal shackle at her.  She was charged with assault and battery 
on a sentinel in execution of her duty.  She told a doctor that she hit the sentinel because 
the  woman  had  rudely  interrupted  a  conversation  she  was  having  and  the  applicant 
thought the sentinel might hit her.  On November 13, 1986, the applicant saw the coun-
selor again and told her that she would not be coming again because she had no issues 
to work on and that everything would be fine if the charges were dropped. 

 
On  November  25,  1986,  the  applicant  was  counseled  about  asking  for  rides  to 
Navy base clubs since she was underage and not allowed to drink alcohol.  On Novem-
ber 28, 1986, she sought and received a prescription for birth control pills. 

 
On December 17, 1986, the applicant was convicted of assault and battery by a 
special court-martial.  She was restricted to base for two months, reduced to pay grade 

E-1,  fined  $600,  and  ordered  to  perform  hard  labor  without  confinement  for  three 
months. 
 
On  January  26,  1987,  the  applicant  was  admitted  to  a  hospital  in  xxxxxxxxx, 
xxxxxxxxxxxxx.  She stated that she “had a bad day at work so I took some pills.”  She 
stated  that  she  had  taken  Vibramycin,  Septra,  Motrin,  cocaine,  and  alcohol,  and  then 
walked up to a guard and reported what she had done.  She was admitted to the psy-
chiatric ward for observation. 

 
On February 2, 1987, the applicant was discharged from the hospital.  Her psy-
chiatrist reported that she had admitted that she smoked marijuana and cigarettes, but 
denied  other  recent  drug  use,  although  she  admitted  that  she  had  used  cocaine  as  a 
teenager.  He reported that her urine had tested positive for cocaine use.  She told the 
psychiatrist that she had joined the Coast Guard after two years of college because she 
was bored.  Her father had graduated from college and was an officer in the Army.  The 
psychiatrist found that her “affect was ambivalent and at times inappropriate,” but that 
there was “no evidence of delusions, paranoia, or perceptual impairments. … Oriented 
in  three  spheres,  cognition  was  adequate.    Abstractions  were  simplistic.    Recent  and 
remote memory were intact.  Judgment and insight were fair.”  He stated that the staff 
was impressed by her “impulsivity, affective instability, history of physically self-dam-
aging acts, feelings of boredom, and manipulation.”  He diagnosed her with “1. Suicide 
gesture—Resolved;  2.  Borderline  Personality  Disorder—manifested  by  impulsivity, 
manipulation,  anger,  affective  instability,  physically  self-damaging  acts,  and  impair-
ment  of  social  and  occupational  spheres;  3.  Bilateral  keratoconjunctivitis—Resolving; 
4. Cocaine  abuse—Unresolved.”    He  further  stated  that  she  was  fully  accountable  for 
her actions and fit for duty.  He recommended that she be administratively discharged 
because of her personality disorder. 

 
Also  on  February  2,  1987,  the  applicant’s  commanding  officer  forwarded  the 
record  of  the  special  court-martial  to  the  convening  authority.    The  sentence  was 
approved on February 10, 1987. 

 
On  February  11,  1987,  the  applicant  underwent  a  physical  examination  and 
reported that she was in good health and taking no medications.  The doctor reported 
that she had no conditions that were physically disabling. 

 
On February 13, 1987, the applicant was supposed to appear at a summary court-
martial  for  having  broken  the  restrictions  of  her  special  court-martial  by  leaving  the 
base.    However,  that  morning  she  was  found  to  have  been  AWOL  since  the  night 
before, February 12th, and was declared a deserter.  She was apprehended on February 
15th. 

 

On February 15, 1987, the applicant was admitted to the same hospital after not-
ing on a brig questionnaire that she felt suicidal.  She told the psychiatrist that she still 
felt suicidal but had no specific plan to kill herself.  She also told him that she drank 
alcohol  every  weekend  and  could  “easily  handle  a  twelve  pack  of  beer”  but  denied 
being alcoholic or having blackouts.  She reported feeling bad, guilty, worthless, dirty, 
sleepy, sleepless, and sad.  She “denied paranoid ideation but did report hearing a low, 
muffled, disguised voice that allegedly God had put into her head.  She reported she 
last heard the voice this morning and first heard it in XXXXXX when she had the suicide 
attempt with the antidepressants.  The voice tells her how bad, dirty, and undeserving 
she is.”  The psychiatrist stated that “[a]side from her admitting auditory hallucinations, 
she [in] no other way appears psychotic.  Suspect coercive manipulation.  Cognition is 
intact.”    She  admitted  to  having  previously  set  a  fire  in  the  barracks  and  said  that  a 
voice told her to do it.  She was diagnosed with “1. Borderline Personality Disorder; 2. 
Suicidal  ideation—Unresolved;  3.  Cocaine  abuse  by  history.” 
  The  psychiatrist 
recommended further evaluation. 

 
On February 17, 1987, the applicant was removed from the xxxxxxxxxx hospital 
and  taken  to the  Philadelphia  brig,  where  she  again  stated that  she  felt  suicidal.    She 
was initially taken to a Navy hospital in Philadelphia.  However, since that hospital had 
no female inpatient care, on February 18, 1987, she was transferred to the Navy hospital 
in xxxxxxxx, xxxxxxxxxx.  At this hospital, the applicant told a psychiatrist that she had 
been physically and sexually abused by her father many times and that she had begun 
using cocaine after she turned 20 years old.  She also complained of hearing voices in 
her head since she started work in XXXXXX.  She said that the voices had told her to 
attack  her  best  friend,  which  had  resulted  in  her  being  court-martialed  in  December.  
The  doctor  decided  to  prescribe  Haldol,  an  anti-psychotic  medication,  and  diagnosed 
her with “Schizophreniform disorder (based on the uncertainty of the exact cause of her 
mental  status  whether  it’s  a  latent  drug  reaction  that  precipitates  a  pre-existing  psy-
chotic condition and certainly of such short duration that it does not appear to be a full 
blown schizophrenic disorder at this time).”  He recommended that she should be fur-
ther evaluated to determine whether she was experiencing symptoms of cocaine abuse 
or schizophrenia. 

 
On February 26, 1987, the applicant was transferred to the psychiatric ward of an 
Air Force hospital in xxxxxx for observation and evaluation.  A psychiatrist noted that 
she  “is  an  extremely  poor  historian  with  a  history  of  giving  numerous  contradictory, 
evasive, and incorrect histories on previous admissions.”  She told the psychiatrist that 
she was admitted because she had had a nervous breakdown due to trouble with her 
supervisor and that she had started hearing the voice of the deceased father of her child 
in her head in December 1986.  It was this voice that told her to attack her coworker.  
She admitted to “a history of cocaine use, with snorting and smoking cocaine occasion-
ally.”  The psychiatrist further reported that the applicant later told her that her father 

had served eight years in prison for murder and that he was abusive and alcoholic.  The 
applicant later admitted that the father of her child was not actually dead. 

 
The  psychiatrist  noted  that  the  applicant’s  supervisor  provided  a  “remarkably 
different” history of the applicant.  Her supervisor stated, among other things, that the 
applicant had been using claims of feeling suicidal in order to get out of the brig.  She 
had been found drunk three times and had been taken to mast for that.  She had tried to 
get someone to buy cocaine for her while she was in the hospital in January and had 
told someone else that “being in the hospital, acting crazy and suicidal was a great way 
to  keep  her  from  going  to  the  brig.”    In  addition,  she  was  awaiting  a  general  court-
martial on two counts of arson since she had admitted to setting fires in the barracks 
twice and on counts of disobeying orders and insubordination.  The supervisor stated 
that the applicant had a “long history of lying and manipulative threats.”   

 
The psychiatrist stated that the applicant’s movements were normal and that her 
speech rhythm was normal and “goal directed.”  Apart from the applicant’s complaint 
of hearing voices, the psychiatrist found “no looseness of associations, circumstantiality 
or  tangentiality.”    When  confronted  with  her  contradictions  and  told  that  she  would 
most likely go back to the brig, the applicant said she would rather die than go back.  
The  applicant  said  that  she  “shouldn’t  be  held  responsible  for  her  actions  in  the  past 
since a voice told her to do them.”  The psychiatrist stated that the applicant’s complaint 
of hearing a voice in her head is “most likely malingering” and that her “main diagnosis 
is of an anti-social personality.”  “[S]he is prone to making manipulative threats [of sui-
cide].”  The psychiatrist stated that the applicant’s primary diagnosis is (1) an anti-social 
personality disorder but that the applicant also had diagnoses of (2) cocaine abuse, (3) 
alcohol abuse, (4) an “adjustment disorder with mixed emotional features characterized 
by depression, anger and threats of suicidal gestures secondary to not wanting to go to 
jail,” and (5) malingering, in that  “the patient’s complaint of auditory hallucinations are 
a voluntary production on her part in order to avoid responsibility for the actions that 
she has done in the past and is responsible for.”  The psychiatrist stated that the appli-
cant’s “complaints of hearing voices telling her to hurt herself or others is a manipulat-
ive attempt on her part to avoid responsibility for her actions. … If she does go to jail, 
this is a person who is prone to act out and possibly do suicidal gestures to avoid pun-
ishment.”  The psychiatrist also noted that the applicant was no longer taking Haldol. 

 
On March 11, 1987, the applicant was transferred back to the brig in Philadelphia 
pending  her  general  court-martial.    The  charges  against  her  now  included  arson, 
cocaine  abuse,  soliciting  another  to  purchase  illegal  drugs,  unauthorized  absence, 
insubordination,  and  disobeying  orders.    A  general  court-martial  was  scheduled,  and 
she was assigned counsel. 

 
On  March  20,  1987,  the  applicant  again  complained  of  hearing  voices  and  was 
evaluated by a psychiatrist.  He reported that her symptoms might be due to “cocaine 

withdrawal.”  He found that she was reasonably bright, reported no current hallucina-
tions or suicidal ideations, and showed no symptoms of an organic brain disease.  He 
diagnosed her with a borderline personality disorder and a history of cocaine and alco-
hol abuse. 

 
At the request of the applicant’s counsel, she was seen by a psychiatrist in two 
sessions on May 8 and 12, 1987, for the purpose of a Sanity Board to determine whether 
she was competent to stand trial.  She told the psychiatrist that she had been physically 
and sexually abused  by her alcoholic father  as a child and that she had started using 
cocaine after she turned 20 years old and had used cocaine every day until she was put 
in  the  brig.    She  told  him  that  her  troubles  began  after  she  was  sexually  assaulted  in 
XXXXXX.  The psychiatrist reported that the applicant showed an unconcerned, bland 
affect,  had  vague  and  circumstantial  thought  processes,  and  had  paranoid  delusions 
about the entire Coast Guard.  He described her delusions as follows:   

 
When asked what  the judge’s function was [as  her upcoming court-martial], she stated 
“he’s the one  who’s going  to send  me to jail … but they are all out to get me.”  When 
asked what her defense attorney’s function was, she stated “to work with the prosecuting 
lawyer  …  they  all  work  together  …  he’s  probably  working  for  them.”    She  went  on  to 
state that “nobody on the whole Base likes me, so they can’t get any character witnesses 
… they know I didn’t do it.  I’m a scapegoat.”3 
 
The  psychiatrist  concluded  that  her  insight  and  judgment  were  psychotically 
impaired.  The results of a Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory were consistent 
with  psychosis  but  a  Rorschack  test  was  inconclusive  because  of  her  “inability  or 
unwillingness to cooperate.” 

 
On May 15, 1987, the Sanity Board, composed of the same psychiatrist and one 
other doctor, reported that the applicant’s diagnoses were (1) schizophrenia, paranoid 
type, (2) cocaine abuse, (3) borderline personality disorder.  It found that, at the time of 
her criminal conduct, she “did not lack substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality 
of her conduct of all charges except that of arson (Article 126).  In regard to that charge, 
it is the opinion of this board that the accused did lack substantial capacity to appreciate 
the criminality of her conduct.”  Similarly, the Sanity Board stated that the applicant’s 
schizophrenia  caused  her  to  lack  substantial  capacity  to  conform  her  conduct  to  the 
requirements of the law only with respect to the charge of arson.  The Sanity Board con-
cluded that she “does have sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature of the 
proceedings but she does not have sufficient mental capacity to conduct or cooperate 
intelligibly in the defense.”  The Sanity Board reported that, in light of its finding that 

                                                 
3 In light of the fact that the applicant’s conviction was later overturned when the judge learned that her 
defense  attorney  was  in  fact  supervised  by  the  prosecutor,  the  “delusional”  nature  of  the  applicant’s 
statements to the psychiatrist and the conclusions of the Sanity Board are questionable. 

the applicant was incompetent to stand trial, arrangements had been made to transfer 
her to a psychiatric facility at the Naval hospital in xxxxxxxx, xxxxxxxx, for treatment. 

 
On  May  19,  1987,  the  applicant  was  transferred  to  the  hospital  in  xxxxxxx  for 
treatment so that she might become competent to stand trial.  There, she told the doc-
tors that she had drunk alcohol since she was 14 years old and suffered frequent black-
outs and that she had frequently used cocaine and marijuana.  A psychiatrist noted that 
the  applicant  was  angry  but  that  her  thought  processes  were  “logical,  goal-oriented, 
and  without  evidence  of  overt  disorder.    Thought  content  was  without  evidence  of 
delusional  material  or  hallucinatory  experiences  on  initial  interview.  …    Insight  and 
judgment were influenced by her character traits but appeared to be sufficient to assure 
responsibility for her actions.”  While at the hospital, the applicant had several “verbal 
and physical outbursts which were unaccompanied by any overt evidence of psycho-
sis.”    The  applicant’s  mother reported that she  had  a  long-standing  history  of  violent 
behavior and anger and altercations with authorities.  When asked about her outbursts 
after the fact, the applicant first stated that they were preceded by racing thoughts that 
“progressed  to  a  vaguely  described  internal  ‘voice’  which  lasted  briefly  and  was  not 
described  as  compelling  or  commanding.”    Rorschack  testing  provided  “compelling 
evidence  for  formal  thought  disorder  when  evaluated  by  several  different  methods.”  
After  two  weeks  of  observation  and  evaluation,  the  hospital  staff  met  and  concluded 
that the applicant “most likely suffered from an atypical psychosis[4] in addition to anti-
social personality disorder, cocaine abuse, and alcoholism.”  These findings were later 
confirmed by a conference of staff psychiatrists.  While at xxxxxxxxx, the applicant was 
prescribed thiothixene, an anti-psychotic medicine. 

 
On June 16, 1987, an Initial Medical Board (IMB) found that the applicant had a 
diagnosis of atypical psychosis, which did not exist prior to her enlistment, and cocaine 
abuse, alcohol abuse, and an anti-social personality disorder, which were found to have 
pre-existed her enlistment.  The IMB found that the conditions rendered her unfit for 
further military service and referred her for evaluation by a Central Physical Evaluation 
Board (CPEB).  The IMB further found that the applicant was mentally capable of han-
dling her own financial affairs,  competent to be discharged to her own custody,  and 
also competent to stand trial.  However, it stated that “[a]ttention is invited to the Sanity 
Board of 12 May 1987 for the findings concerning responsibility.” 

 
On July 30, 1987, the applicant was discharged from the xxxxxxxxxx Naval hospi-
tal.    Upon  her  discharge,  she  was  diagnosed  with  paranoid  schizophrenia  (instead  of 
atypical  psychosis),  cocaine  abuse,  alcoholism,  and  “anti-social  personality  disorder 

                                                 
4 There is no definition of “atypical psychosis” in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic And 
Statistical Manual Of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Test Revision.  See DSM-IV-TR, p. 297 et seq. (Wash-
ington, D.C., 2000).  The BCMR presumes that it is a form of psychosis whose array of symptoms does not 
meet the criteria for any of the defined psychoses in DSM-IV-TR. 

with  borderline  features.”  She  was  also  found  to  be  pregnant,  and  she  alleged  that  a 
guard at the Philadelphia brig had sexually assaulted her.  Therefore, she was no longer 
given thiothixene, and she was incarcerated at Quantico Marine Base in Virginia. 

 
On August 10, 1987, the applicant complained of hearing voices that told her to 
hurt  people  and  that  she  was  going  to  die  that  night.    She  was  admitted  to  the  xxxx 
Naval hospital.  Her  psychiatrist found that she presented a bland affect but that her 
thoughts  processes  were  linear  and  goal  directed  and  her  judgment  and  insight  were 
fair.  During her 11 days in the hospital, she continued to complain of hearing voices 
and therefore was prescribed 5 milligrams of Haldol twice a day.  However, she “dem-
onstrated  no  overt  evidence  of  grossly  psychotic  behavior  through  both  observation 
and  serial  mental  status  evaluations.”    Upon  the  advice  of  her  defense  counsel,  she 
“refused to discuss any aspect of the charges against her, and the content of her discus-
sions was superficial.”  Upon her discharge from the hospital, the psychiatrist repeated 
the  final  diagnoses  that  she  had  received  at  xxxxxxxxxx  but  reported  that  she  “does 
have sufficient mental capacity to conduct and cooperate intelligently in her defense.”  
He further recommended that upon resolution of the charges against her, she be read-
mitted to a hospital for execution of a medical board. 

 
From  August  25  to  29,  the  applicant  was  tried  by  general  court-martial  at  her 
duty station in xxxxxxxxx, xxxxxxxxxxxx.  The court-martial had been convened by the 
Commander of the XXX Coast Guard District.  The applicant pled not guilty to charges 
of  cocaine  use,  disrespect,  unauthorized  absence,  breaking  restriction,  soliciting  to 
commit an offense, and arson, in violation of Articles 86, 91, 112a, 126, and 134 of the 
UCMJ.  She was convicted and sentenced to a bad conduct discharge and incarceration 
for  three  years  and  three  months.5    On  August  29,  1987,  the  convening  authority 
approved the sentence. 

 
On September 2, 1987, upon arriving at Fort Leavenworth to serve her sentence, 
a doctor noted that the applicant was four months pregnant and was still taking Haldol 
for her paranoid schizophrenia.  

 
In  October  1987,  the  applicant  began  to  refuse  to  take  Haldol  because  she  dis-
liked the side effects.  On October 8, 1987, her psychiatrist noted that she had not had a 
psychotic episode for three weeks.  On October 11, 1987, he reported that she was still 
refusing to take Haldol and that her diagnosis was either (1) borderline personality dis-
order  with  decompensation,  (2)  paranoid  schizophrenia,  or  (3)  depression  with  psy-
chotic features. 
                                                 
5  It is unclear from the record whether the applicant was convicted of arson, since the Sanity Board had 
held  that  she  lacked  “substantial  capacity  to  appreciate  the  criminality  of  her  conduct”  in  committing 
arson and that she lacked “substantial capacity to conform her conduct to the requirement of the law.”  
The Board notes that the IMB, although it found her to be competent for trial, referred to these findings 
regarding the applicant’s responsibility for her crimes.   

 
On  November  4,  1987,  a  doctor  noted  that  the  applicant  was  showing  no  evi-
dence of any thought disorder, that she was showing good judgment and insight, and 
that he planned to taper her off medication.  On November 19, 1987, the doctor reported 
that she was still showing no signs of psychosis and that he would taper off her medi-
cations.    Reports  of  her  later  pre-natal  examinations  indicate  that  she  was  no  longer 
taking Haldol but was taking Benadryl because of the remaining side effects of the Hal-
dol. 

 
The applicant gave birth to her second child on February 20, 1988. 
 
On March 10, 1988, the applicant “acted out” in some way and was disciplined.  
A doctor reported that there was no evidence of thought disorder and that her thoughts 
were clear and coherent, although she was angry and sulked when told she was respon-
sible for her own behavior. 

 
On  March  24,  1988,  the  applicant  sought  medication  for  insomnia.    The  doctor 
refused her request.  He reported that she had no condition that required a sleeping aid 
and  no  psychotic  symptoms.    He  reported  that  her  insight  and  judgment  were  fair.  
Thereafter, until her release from confinement in August 1989, the applicant was treated 
only for such physical ailments as an ingrown toenail, a cold sore, an irregular heart-
beat, conjunctivitis, a urinary tract infection, and a hurt finger.  No further complaints of 
or treatment for psychotic symptoms were reported. 

 
On May 24, 1989, the applicant’s conviction was overturned on appeal because it 
was  discovered  that  the  prosecuting  attorney  was  the  immediate  supervisor  of  her 
defense counsel for all of his duties except his trial work.  Although her defense counsel 
had informed her of this fact, the judge found that, being on an anti-psychotic medica-
tion at the time, she did not appreciate the full implications of his revelation.  In render-
ing his decision, the court noted that the Coast Guard had assigned a recent law school 
graduate to represent her on very serious charges.  The court also granted authority to 
retry to the applicant.  She was removed from the prison at Leavenworth and returned 
to her prior command for pre-trial confinement, pending a new trial. 

 
On June 12, 1989, the applicant underwent a physical examination.  A psychia-
trist noted that she had not needed any anti-psychotic medications for over two years, 
that  she  had  completed  a  drug  rehabilitation  program  and  a  year  of  college  courses 
while  at  Leavenworth.    He  reported  that  she  was  “fully  oriented,  alert,  cooperative.  
Good eye contact. … Mood euthymic. …  Thoughts logical/goal directed. … No recent 
[history] of hallucinatory phenomena.  No evidence of perceptual disturbance, incoher-
ence,  loosening  of  associations,  [or]  disorganized  behavior.  …  Cognitive  functions/ 
memory unimpaired.  Judgment/insight appropriate.”  The psychiatrist reported that 

her schizophrenia, drug and alcohol abuse, and anti-social personality disorder were all 
in remission and that she was “psychiatrically fit.” 

 
On August 4, 1989, the applicant, represented by new counsel, formally request-
ed  an  OTH  discharge  “for  the  good  of  the  Service  in  lieu  of  [another]  trial  by  court-
martial  under  circumstances  which  could  lead  to  a  bad  conduct  or  dishonorable  dis-
charge.”  The letter indicates that she was “completely satisfied” with her new counsel 
and  that  her  request  “stems  from  [her]  misconduct  contained  in  the  court-martial 
charges” against her.  The letter states that she understood that “such a discharge may 
deprive [her] of all veterans’ benefits” and that she could “expect to encounter substan-
tial prejudice in civilian life” because of the OTH. 

 
On August 8, 1989, the Commander of the Seventh District forwarded the appli-
cant’s  request  to  the  Commandant  with  a  recommendation  that  it  be  approved.    He 
pointed  out  that  the  applicant  had  served  most  of  the  sentence  handed  down  in  her 
original  conviction  and  that  some  of  the  witnesses  had  left  the  Service,  which  would 
make re-proving the case “an expensive and difficult proposition.”  He included with 
his endorsement a medical report on the applicant. 

 
On August 11, 1989, the Commandant ordered that the applicant be administra-
tively discharged within 30 days under other than honorable conditions for the good of 
the service, in accordance with Article 12-B-21 of the Personnel Manual. 

 
On August 28, 1989, the applicant was discharged in accordance with Article 12-
B-21 of the Personnel Manual.  Her DD 214 shows “under other than honorable condi-
tions” as the character of discharge; “for the good of the service” as the narrative reason 
for  separation;  RE-4  (ineligible  for  reenlistment)  as  her  reenlistment  code;  and  KFS 
(which  means  “voluntary  discharge  allowed  by  established  directive  when  separated 
for conduct triable by court martial for which the member may voluntarily separate in 
lieu of going to trial”) as her separation code.  She had served 3 years, 2 months, and 16 
days on active duty, including the time she was in confinement from March 12, 1987, to 
August 9, 1989, but not including her days AWOL. 

 
On  December  29,  2001,  the  applicant  applied  to  the  Coast  Guard’s  Discharge 
Review Board (DRB) for the same relief she seeks in this application.  On June 28, 2002, 
the DRB informed the applicant that it could not act on her request because it involves a 
medical condition.6  The DRB advised her to apply to the BCMR. 
 

                                                 
6  The DRB’s enabling statute, 10 U.S.C. § 1553, does not authorize the Secretary to pay any money found 
to be owed to an applicant upon the correction of the record by the DRB.  Therefore, the DRB does not 
normally  handle  cases  in  which  an  applicant  requests  a  medical  discharge  that  could  result  in  money 
being owed to the applicant. 

VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

 
 
On February 27, 2003, the Chief Counsel submitted an advisory opinion in which 
he recommended that the Board deny relief in this case.  Copies of the advisory opinion 
and  an  attached  memorandum  on  the  case  prepared  by  the  Coast  Guard  Personnel 
Command (CGPC) are attached to this Final Decision below. 
  

APPLICANT’S RESPONSE TO THE VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

On February 28, 2003, the Chair sent the applicant a copy of the advisory opinion 

 
 
and invited her to respond within 15 days.  No response was received.   
 

APPLICABLE LAW 

 

 
The Chief Counsel and CGPC cited Article  12-B-1.e.1. of the Personnel Manual 
regarding “Cases Involving Concurrent Disability Evaluation and Disciplinary Action.”  
This provision, which was added to the Personnel Manual with Change 13 in Septem-
ber 1991, two years after the applicant’s discharge, states the following: 
 

Disability  statutes  do  not  preclude  disciplinary  separation.  The  separations  described 
here supersede disability separation or retirement.  If Commander, (CGPC-adm) is proc-
essing  a  member  for  disability  while  simultaneously  Commander,  (CGPC-epm-1)  is 
evaluating  him  or  her  for  an  involuntary  administrative  separation  for  misconduct  or 
disciplinary proceedings which could result in a punitive discharge or an unsuspended 
punitive discharge is pending, Commander, (CGPC-adm) suspends the disability evalua-
tion  and  Commander,  (CGPC-epm-1)  considers  the  disciplinary  action.    If  the  action 
taken  does  not  include  punitive  or  administrative  discharge  for  misconduct,  Com-
mander, (CGPC-epm-1) sends or returns the case to Commander, (CGPC-adm) for proc-
essing.    If  the  action  includes  either  a  punitive  or  administrative  discharge  for  miscon-
duct,  the  medical  board  report  shall  be  filed  in  the  terminated  member's  medical 
personnel data record (MED PDR). 

 

Although the Chief Counsel and CGPC cited Article 2-C-11. of the PDES Manual, 
which  reflects  Article  12-B-1.e.1.  of  the  Personnel  Manual  after  1991  and  provides  for 
the suspension of PDES processing when a member is undergoing disciplinary proceed-
ings that could result in a punitive discharge, that article was not in the PDES Manual 
published in 1988.  It appeared in the PDES Manual published in 1996. 

 
The Medical Manual and the Physical Disability Evaluation System (PDES) Man-
ual govern the separation or retirement of members due to physical disability.  Under 
Chapters 3 and 5 of the Medical Manual,  members diagnosed  with schizophrenia are 
disqualified from further service and should be processed under the PDES for adminis-
trative medical discharges.  Article 2-C-2.b. of the PDES Manual in effect in 1989 pro-
vided  that  the  “law  that  provides  for  disability  retirement  or  separation  (Chapter  61, 
Title 10, U.S. Code) is designed to compensate members whose military service is ter-

minated due to a physical disability that has rendered the member unfit for continued 
duty.” 
 
Article  12-B-11.h.(1)  of  the  Personnel  Manual  in  effect  in  1989  provided  that  a 
member awaiting trial by court-martial should be retained on active duty until the trial 
was complete and the member had completed any sentence to confinement. 

 
Rule  203(c)(1)  of  the  Rules  for  Courts-Martial  in  1987  provided  that  “[w]hen 
jurisdiction attaches over a servicemember on active duty, that servicemember may be 
held  on  active  duty  over  objection  pending  disposition  of  any  offense  for  which  held 
and shall remain subject to the code during the entire period.” 
 

Rule  706  of  the  Rules  for  Courts-Martial  provided  that,  if  an  accused’s  mental 
capacity  or  responsibility  was  called  into  question,  the  convening  authority  would 
order  a  mental  examination  by  a  board  of  one  or  more  physicians  to  determine  the 
mental capacity and mental responsibility of the accused.  The board’s findings were to 
include the accused’s diagnosis at the time of the crime, whether she lacked substantial 
capacity  to  appreciate  the  criminality  of  the  conduct,  whether  she  lacked  substantial 
capacity to conform her conduct to the requirements of law, and whether she had suffi-
cient mental capacity to understand the nature of the proceedings and to assist in her 
defense.    The  mental  capacity  of  a  person  to  stand  trial  is  ultimately  decided  by  the 
military  judge.    If  the  military  judge  determines  that  the  member  lacks  the  mental 
capacity to stand trial, the member may be administratively discharged because of the 
mental disability. See Rules 801(e) and 909 (Discussion). 
 
 
 

Article 12-B-21 of the Personnel Manual in effect in 1989 provided the following: 

a.  An enlisted member may request a discharge under other than honorable conditions 
for the good  of the Service in lieu of action under the UCMJ if punishment for alleged 
misconduct could result in a punitive discharge. … 
b.  [Such a request does not suspend legal proceedings.] 
c.  A member who indicates a desire to submit a request for a discharge under other than 
honorable conditions for the good of the Service will be assigned a lawyer counsel. … 
d.  [Provides the exact wording of the letter to be submitted to make such a request.] 
e.  The request for discharge shall be forwarded via the chain of command to the Com-
mandant (G-PE).  The member’s commanding officer shall recommend approval or dis-
approval of the member’s  request  with appropriate justification for his/her recommen-
dation,  certify  accuracy  of  the  court-martial  charges,  and  enclose  the  following  in  the 
endorsement:  (1) A report of medical examination and either an opinion from the medi-
cal officer that a psychiatric evaluation is not warranted as part of the evaluation process-
ing or a copy of the psychiatric evaluation. … 
f.  The reason for discharge shall be for the good of the Service and the member shall not 
be recommended for reenlistment.  If the Commandant is of the opinion that, based on 
the  facts  of  the  case,  the  member  warrants  a  more  favorable  type  discharge  than  dis-
charge under other than honorable conditions, the Commandant may direct issuance of 
an honorable or general discharge. 

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 

 

 
The  Board  makes  the  following  findings  and  conclusions  on  the  basis  of  the 
 
applicant's military record and submissions, the Coast Guard's submissions, and appli-
cable law: 
 

The  Board  has  jurisdiction  concerning  this  matter  pursuant  to  10  U.S.C. 

1. 
§ 1552.   
 

2. 

An application to the Board must be filed within three years of the day the 
applicant discovers the alleged error in her record. 10 U.S.C. § 1552(b).  Although the 
applicant  stated  that  she  did  not  discover  the  alleged  error  until  August  1,  2001,  and 
asked  the  Board  to  take  into  account  her  medical  condition,  the  Board  finds  that  she 
knew or should have known that she had not received an honorable discharge by rea-
son of physical disability (schizophrenia) when she was discharged in 1989.  Therefore, 
her application was untimely by approximately ten years. 

 
3. 

Under 10 U.S.C. § 1552(b), the Board may waive the three-year statute of 
limitations if it is in the interest of justice to do so.  To determine whether it is in the 
interest of justice to waive the statute of limitations, the Board should consider the rea-
sons for the applicant’s delay and conduct a cursory review of the merits of the case.  
Allen v. Card, 799 F. Supp. 158, 164 (D.D.C. 1992). 

 
4. 

The applicant alleged that the delay was caused by her illness and her not 
knowing her options.  However, the record indicates that, at the time of her discharge in 
August 1989, the applicant had not complained of or received medication for any psy-
chotic  symptoms  since  November  1987.    Moreover,  the  applicant  was  represented  by 
counsel.  The Board finds that the applicant’s explanation for her delay in applying for 
relief is not compelling. 

 
5. 

The applicant alleged that because of her schizophrenia, she should have 
been  processed  under  the  PDES  and  received  an  honorable  discharge  by  reason  of 
physical disability.  However, under Rule 202(c)(1) of the Rules for Courts-Martial and 
Article 12-B-11.h. of the Personnel Manual then in effect, the Coast Guard was entitled 
to retain the applicant on active duty pending proper disposition of the charges against 
her.  Therefore, the Board finds that the applicant’s diagnosis did not preclude the Coast 
Guard from retaining her in the service while she underwent a general court-martial on 
multiple  criminal  charges,  served  her  sentence,  and—after  her  conviction  was  set 
aside—awaited re-trial. 

 
6. 

Moreover,  Article  2-C-2.b.  of  the  PDES  Manual  provided  that  the  “law 
that provides for disability retirement or separation … is designed to compensate mem-

bers whose military service is terminated due to a physical disability that has rendered 
the member unfit for continued duty.”  As stated above, the applicant’s medical record 
indicates that she had not complained of or been treated for any symptoms of schizo-
phrenia during the 22 months before her discharge.  In addition, she had been found 
“psychiatrically fit” in June 1989, just two months before her discharge.  Therefore, the 
Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence in the record indicates that, at the 
time of her discharge in August 1989, the applicant did not suffer from any psychotic 
symptoms that rendered her unfit for military duty. 

 
7. 

The  applicant  alleged  that  her  diagnosed  schizophrenia  caused  her  to 
commit the crimes that resulted in her being court-martialed and in her later request for 
an OTH discharge in lieu of re-trial.  However, the applicant has submitted no evidence 
to  contradict  the  findings  of  the  Sanity  Board  in  May  1987,  which  determined  that 
despite her schizophrenia, she was responsible for most of her actions that resulted in 
the criminal charges against her.  Absent evidence to the contrary, the Board presumes 
that  government  officials—including  the  doctors  on  the  Sanity  Board  and  the  officers 
who  charged  the  applicant  under  the  UCMJ—have  acted  correctly,  lawfully,  and  in 
good faith.  Arens v. United States, 969 F.2d 1034, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sanders v. United 
States, 594 F.2d 804, 813 (Ct. Cl. 1979).  The applicant has submitted no evidence to over-
come the presumption of regularity accorded the actions of those doctors and officers. 

 
8. 

The applicant’s original conviction was overturned because of a conflict of 
interest between her defense counsel and the prosecutor.  The record indicates that she 
knew about the conflict of interest at the time of her trial, but the judge determined that 
she did not have the capacity to appreciate the implications of the conflict.  The record 
indicates that the applicant was assigned new, more experienced counsel and that, with 
the advice of this counsel, she requested and was granted an OTH discharge, knowing 
that such a discharge would deprive her of veterans’ benefits.  The applicant could have 
refused to request the OTH discharge and undergone the re-trial, risking the reimposi-
tion  of  the  sentence  imposed  at  her  first  trial.    By  requesting  the  OTH  discharge,  the 
applicant apparently avoided a punitive, bad conduct discharge and having to complete 
the remainder of her sentence.  The record indicates that upon her voluntary request, 
the  applicant  was  properly  discharged  in  accordance  with  Article  12-B-21  of  the  Per-
sonnel Manual in effect in 1989. 

 
9. 

Although the applicant submitted evidence showing that she is once again 
being treated for a psychotic illness, her military record shows that during her last 22 
months in the Coast Guard, while she was incarcerated at Fort Leavenworth and could 
not get cocaine or alcohol, she was not psychotic and was in fact “psychiatrically fit.”  
The fact that the records of crime she later committed as a civilian have apparently been 
sealed is irrelevant to the Board’s determination of whether the Coast Guard committed 
any error or injustice in awarding her an OTH discharge. 

 

10. 

The  Board  finds  that the  applicant  has  not proved  that  the  Coast  Guard 
committed  an  error  in  discharging  her  in  accordance  with  Article  12-B-21  of  the 
Personnel Manual, upon her voluntary request, in lieu of retrying her by court-martial.  
Nor has she proved that her OTH discharge “shocks the sense of justice.”  See Reale v. 
United States, 208 Ct. Cl. 949 (1976), and Decision of the Deputy General Counsel, BCMR 
Docket No. 2001-043.   

 
11.  Accordingly,  the  applicant’s  request  should  be  denied  based  on  its 

 
untimeliness and lack of merit. 
 
 
 
 
 

[ORDER AND SIGNATURES APPEAR ON NEXT PAGE] 

 

 

ORDER 

 

The application of former SR xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, USCG, for correction 

 
 

 
 

of her military record is denied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 

 
 Julia Andrews 

 

 

 

 
 Nancy Lynn Friedman 

 

 

 

 
 George J. Jordan 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                         Memorandum 

 
 

  Subject:  ADVISORY OPINION  IN CGBCMR 

DOCKET NO. 2002-165 (XXXXX) 

 

From:  Chief Counsel, U.S. Coast Guard  

Date: 

Reply to 
Attn. Of: 

 
5420/3 
G-LMJ 
CDR Vachon 
70116 

To:  Chairman, Board for Correction 

 
                of Military Records (C-60) 

 

Ref:  (a)  Applicant's DD Form 149 filed 9 September 2002 
 

1.  I adopt the analysis provided by Commander, Coast Guard Personnel Command in enclosure 
(1) and request you accept his comments and my following additional comments as the Coast 
Guard’s advisory opinion recommending denying relief in the instant case. 

2.  The Applicant alleges that her mental disorder (schizophrenia) was the cause of her criminal 
actions that led to her “Other than honorable discharge”(“OTH”) that she received in lieu of 
court-martial.   Applicant asserts that she should have received a medical discharge rather than 
an “OTH” discharge.    

3.  Facts of the Case: See Matters of Records, Enclosure (1).  

4.  Analysis: The Board should deny relief in this case because the Applicant, who has 
the burden of proof, has failed to prove that the Coast Guard committed either an error 
or an injustice by discharging her with an OTH in lieu of court-martial.    

a.   Applicant was properly discharged with an OTH discharge. 

(1) Applicant enlisted in the Coast Guard on March 31, 1986.  Beginning in 

September of 1986, the Applicant began her journey of misconduct which included offenses such 
as assault, arson, and unauthorized absence.   

(2) Applicant was court-martialed in 1987 for these offenses.  However, because the 

Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals found a conflict of interest involving the trial counsel 
(prosecutor) and the Applicant’s defense counsel, due to the fact that these two attorneys shared 
the same Supervisor, the Court set aside the findings and ordered a new trial.  In August 1989, 
the XXX District Commander accepted the Applicant’s request for an other than honorable 
discharge in lieu of court-martial.7  During the intervening time, the Applicant had been 
                                                 
7 The xxx District Commander had ordered a court-martial to re-try the Applicant for the offenses that 
she was previously found guilty of.  

examined for mental illness and an Initial Medical Board  diagnosed the Applicant with atypical 
psychosis, cocaine abuse in remission severe anti-social personality disorder and alcohol abuse, 
in remission.   The IMB concluded that the Applicant’s insight and judgment were influenced by 
her character traits but sufficient to assure responsibility for her actions.  The IMB further stated 
that the Applicant’s mental illness rendered her unfit for military service.   

(3) PERSMAN Article 12-B-1e which governs this type of circumstance involving 
concurrent disability evaluation and disciplinary action provides the following:  “If Commander 
(CGPC-adm) is processing a member for disability while simultaneously Commander, (CGPC-
epm-1) is evaluating him or her for an involuntary administrative separation for misconduct or 
disciplinary proceedings which could result in a punitive discharge or an unsuspended punitive 
discharge is pending, Commander, (CGPC-epm-1) considers the disciplinary action.  If the 
action taken does not include punitive or administrative discharge for misconduct, Commander 
(CGPC-adm) sends or returns the case to Commander (CGPC-adm) for processing.  If the action 
includes either a punitive or administrative discharge for misconduct, the medical board report 
shall be filed in the terminated member’s medical personnel date record (MED PDR).”  This 
same process is also set forth in the Physical Disability Evaluation System Manual, 
COMDTINST M1850.2C, Article 2.C.11. 

(4) In the instant case, the Applicant was represented by legal counsel and 

acknowledged her understanding of the repercussions associated with an other than honorable 
discharge.  Also, at the time of her OTH request, the Applicant’s medical history was well-
documented and -- on the basis of the IMB’s findings --  the Coast Guard properly determined 
that it could properly discharge the member in accordance with the policy established under 
PERSMAN 12-B-1e.      

(5)  Absent strong evidence to the contrary, government officials are presumed to 
have carried out their duties correctly, lawfully, and in good faith. Arens v. United States, 969 
F.2d 1034, 1037 (1992);  Sanders v. United States, 594 F.2d 804, 813 (Ct. Cl. 1979).  Based on 
my review of the record, it is my opinion that the Coast Guard did not commit any error or 
prejudice and properly followed its own regulations when it discharged Applicant with an other 
than honorable discharge 

5.  Recommendation: The Coast Guard, therefore, recommends that the Board deny the relief 
requested.  If the Board determines that other matters merit comment by the Coast Guard, we 
would welcome the opportunity to address such matters in accordance with 33 C.F.R. §52.64(b), 
52,81, and 52.82. 

 

 
 
 
Encl: 

 

 

 

 

 

       By direction 

GENELLE T. VACHON 

(1) Commander, CGPC letter 5420 dated 4 Feb 2003 
(2)  Applicant's Service and Medical Record 

Coast 

Guard 

2100  Second  Street,  S.W. 
Washington,  DC  20593-0001 
Symbol:  CGPC-adm-2 
Staff 
Phone: 
267-6969 
FAX: (202) 267-4381 

(202) 

States 

 
Commander 
United 
Personnel Command 
 
 

                                      5420 

  

Reply 
to 
Attn of: 

ENS Crespo 
7-6969 

 

 

 
MEMORANDUM 
 
From
: 

G. W. PALMER 
CGPC-c 

 
To: 
 

Commandant  
(G-LMJ) 

Subj:  PROGRAM INPUT ON CGBCMR APPLICATION (xxxxxxxxxxxxxx) 
 
Ref: 
 

(a) CGBCMR Application 2002-165 

1.  Comments on the application contained in reference (a) are attached as enclosure (1). 

2.   I recommend that no relief be granted.   

# 

(1) Comments concerning CGBCMR Application 2002-165 

 
 
 
Enclosures
: 
 

Enclosure 1 - CGBCMR 2002-165 

 

RELIEF REQUESTED BY APPLICANT: 
 
1.  The  applicant  requests  her  1989  discharge  “Under  Other  than  Honorable 
Conditions”  for  the  good  of  the  service  (in  lieu  of  re-trial  by  Court  Martial)  be 
corrected  to  reflect  an  Honorable  Discharge  due  to  physical  disability  (mental 
disorder).  

 
APPLICANT’S STATED BASIS FOR RELIEF: 
 
1.  The applicant alleges that her behavior and illegal acts she committed which led to 
her “Under Other than Honorable Conditions” discharge were caused by her mental 
disorders.  Therefore, she should never have been accountable for these acts within 
the military justice system and should have received a physical disability retirement 
due to her mental disorder.   

 
MATTERS OF RECORD: 
 
1.  The application is not timely. 
 
2.  March 31, 1986: Applicant enlisted in the U.S. Coast Guard.  
 
3.  September 21, 1986: Applicant surrendered to authorities at Coast Guard Yard after 

being on unauthorized absence since September 15, 1986.   

 
4.  September  21,  1986:    SF  Form  513,  Consultation  Sheet.    Applicant  seen  at  Naval 
Station  XXXXXX  Medical  Clinic  and  reports  suicidal  thoughts,  previous  rapes, 
attempted sexual assaults.  

 
5.  September  29,  1986:    SF  Form  513,  Consultation  Sheet.    Applicant  seen  at  Naval 
Station  XXXXXX  Medical  Clinic  for  alleged  rape  attempts,  suicide  gesture  and 
depression.    She  is  diagnosed  with  adjustment  disorder  and  histrionic  personality 
traits.  Applicant is found fit for full duty. 

 
6.  October  20,  1986.  Applicant  receives  CO’s  NJP  for  the  offense  of  Unauthorized 

Absence and receives 14 days restriction and 14 days extra duty.   

 
7.  October 25, 1986.  Applicant transferred to Base xxxxxxxxxxxx, xx.   
 
8.    November  10,  1986.    Applicant  allegedly  assaults  two  fellow  Coast  Guard 

members. 

 

9.  November  12,  1986.    Administrative  Remarks,  CG-3307.    Applicant  counseled  for 

fighting and harming another CG member. 

 
10. November  25,  1986.    Administrative  Remarks,  CG-3307.    Applicant  counseled  for 
visiting  navy  base  clubs  for  the  purpose  of  drinking.    The  Applicant  was  advised 
against underage drinking. 

 
11. December  17,  1986.    Applicant  convicted  at  Special  Court-Martial  at  CGC  Base 
xxxxxxxxxxx  for  Assault  &  Battery  .    Applicant  was  sentenced  to  2  months 
restriction,  reduced  to  E-1,  fined  $200  per  month  for  3  months,  and  hard  labor 
without  confinement  for  3  months.  The  sentences  was  approved  and  ordered 
executed on February 2, 1987.  

 
12. January 26, 1987.  Applicant admitted to Naval Hospital xxxxxxxxxx for psychiatric 
treatment and evaluation after taking an overdose of pills.  She was diagnosed with 
suicide gesture (resolved), borderline personality disorder and cocaine abuse.  The 
Applicant  was  recommended  for  administrative  separation. 
  Applicant  was 
discharged from hospital on February 2. 1987.   

 
13. February 12, 1987.  Group xxxxxxxxxx Message of February 17, 1987.  Applicant left 
her  unit  and  was  declared  a  deserter.    Applicant  was  scheduled  to  appear  at  a 
Summary Court Martial on February 13.   

 
14. February 15, 1987.  Special agents apprehended the Applicant.   
 
15. February 15-17, 1987.  The Applicant was hospitalized at Naval Hospital xxxxxxxxxx 
for evaluation after expressing “suicidal thinking” during a brig physical.  During 
this hospitalization she admitted to setting a fire in the unit barracks because a voice 
told  her  to.    She  later  stated  she  didn’t  remember  the  incident.  Applicant  was 
diagnosed with a borderline personality disorder, unresolved suicidal ideation and 
unresolved  cocaine  abuse.    The  Applicant  was  released  and  transferred  to  the 
Philadelphia Naval Hospital at the Coast Guard’s request on February 17, 1987, for 
further confinement to the brig.  

 
16. February  18-20,  1987.    Narrative  Summary  of  evaluation  conducted  at  xxxxxxxx 
Army Hospital. (Applicant was admitted to this hospital for evaluation due to the 
unavailability  of  inpatient  psychiatric  facilities  at  Naval  Hospital  xxxxxxxxx.)  
Applicant was evaluated and diagnosed with a “Schizophreniform disorder (based 
on the uncertainty of the exact cause of her mental status whether it’s a latent drug 
reaction  that  precipitates  a  pre-existing  psychotic  condition  and  certainly  of  such 
short duration that it does not appear to be a full blown schizophrenic disorder at 
this time.)”  The Applicant was discharged under escort.   

 

17. February  26  –  March  11,  1987.      The  Applicant  was  re-hospitalized  for  continued 
suicidal  ideation.    The  Applicant  claimed  she  started  having  hallucinations  in 
December  1986,  when  voices  commanded  her  to  assault  a  fellow  CG  member.  
However,  her  Psychiatrist  at  the  time  believed  she  was  feigning  psychosis  and 
diagnosed her with cocaine abuse, alcohol abuse, adjustment disorder, malingering 
and an anti-social personality disorder.  She was returned to the brig on March 6, 
1987. 

 
18. May  15,  1987.    CO,  Naval  Hospital  xxxxxxxxxxxx  letter  6520.    At  the  request  of 
Applicant’s  Commanding  Officer,  she  was  psychiatrically  evaluated  at  Naval 
Hospital  xxxxxxxxx  on  May  8  and  12,  1987  and  diagnosed  with  schizophrenia, 
paranoid type, cocaine abuse, continuous, and borderline personality disorder.  The 
evaluation  further  states  that  a  the  time  of  the  alleged  criminal  conduct,  and  as  a 
result  of  mental  disease,  the  accused  DID  NOT  lack  substantial  capacity  to 
appreciate the criminality of her conduct of all charges except that of arson (article 
126).  In regard to that charge, it was the opinion of the board that the accused DID 
lack  substantial  capacity  to  appreciate  the  criminality  of  her  conduct.    The  board 
further found that with the exception of the arson charge, the Applicant DID NOT 
lack substantial capacity to conform her conduct to the requirement of the law.  The 
board stated that the Applicant did have sufficient capacity to understand the nature 
of  the  proceedings  but  did  not  have  sufficient  mental  capacity  to  conduct  or 
cooperate intelligently in her defense.  The board found the Applicant incompetent 
to  stand  trial,  and  recommended  she  be  transferred  to  an  inpatient  psychiatric 
facility for treatment.   Applicant was transferred to Naval Hospital xxxxxxxxxxx for 
treatment on May 19, 1987. 

 
19. June 6, 1987.  Applicant entered pre-trial confinement. 
   
20. June  16,  1987.    Report  of  Medical  Board.    Applicant  underwent  an  Initial  Medical 
Board at Naval Hospital xxxxxxxxxxxxxx between May 19 and June 16, 1987.  She 
was  diagnosed  with  atypical  psychosis,  cocaine  abuse  in  remission,  severe  anti-
social  personality  disorder  and  alcohol  abuse,  in  remission.    The  Applicant  traced 
her  mental  problems  to  a  sexual  assault  she  suffered  while  assigned  to  Station 
XXXXXX,  XXXXX  in  1986.    She  reported  years  (pre-existing  enlistment)  of  cocaine 
and alcohol abuse.  The board’s evaluation states that Applicant was awaiting court 
martial  on  charges  of  arson,  cocaine  abuse  and  unauthorized  absences  at  the  time 
she deserted on February 12, 1987.  The board concluded that the Applicant’s insight 
and  judgment  were  influenced  by  her  character  traits  but  sufficient  to  assure 
responsibility  for  her  actions.    The  Applicant  suffered  from  a  mental  illness  of 
psychotic proportions that rendered her unfit for military service.  The board found 
that in accordance with chapter 15, JAG manual, paragraph 1504, the Applicant was 
mentally  capable  of  handling  her  financial  affairs  and  competent  to  stand  trial.   
 

21. August 11, 1987. Applicant underwent further psychiatric treatment and evaluation 
at  Naval  Hospital,  xxxxxxxxxxxxx.    She  was  diagnosed  with  atypical  psychosis, 
cocaine  abuse  in  remission,  severe  anti-social  personality  disorder  and  alcohol 
abuse, in remission, and intrauterine pregnancy.  The Applicant was discharged and 
returned to confinement. 

     
22. September  2,  1987. 

  Message  from  Commander,  CG  Group  xxxxxxxx  to 
Commandant  (GpPE-2).    Group  xxxxxxxxxxxx  informed  Commandant  that  the 
Applicant had been found guilty at a General Court Martial on August 29, 1987 and 
sentenced to 3 years, 3 months confinement.  The Applicant was initially confined at 
Quantico,  Virginia  brig.    The  Applicant  was  administratively  assigned  to  Station 
xxxxxxxxxx for personnel accounting purposes. 

 
   
23. May 24, 1989.  In a decision of the USCG Court of Military Review, the Applicant’s 
conviction and sentence were set aside due to a finding that a potential conflict of 
interest existed between the Applicant’s counsel and the government counsel, and 
that  the  Applicant  was  not  made  aware  of  this  issue.    The  Court’s  decision  also 
granted authority to order a rehearing. 

 
24. August 4, 1989.  After a rehearing was ordered, the Applicant requested discharge 
under other than honorable conditions for the good of the service in lieu of trial by 
court-martial.  The  Applicant  stated  that  she  understood  the  consequences  of  her 
request, including the depriving of virtually all veterans’ benefits, and that she “… is 
completely satisfied with the counsel I have received.”   

 
25. August 8, 1989.  Commander, xxxx Coast Guard District endorsement to Applicant’s 
request.  The endorsement notes that Applicant was facing re-trial by special court-
martial  for  a  variety  of  charges,  including  arson,  breaking  restriction,  absence 
without authority terminated by apprehension, cocaine use, solicitation of another to 
commit  drug  offenses,  and  disrespect  to  a  petty  officer.    The  letter  states  that  the 
government had proven each of the charges at her previous trial; evidence presented 
in the transcript of the trial and the precursor investigations establishes the accuracy 
of  the  charges.      The  endorsement  further  states  that  Applicants  Counsel  “…fully 
explained to Seaman Recruit xxxxxxx the implications of her request, and witnessed 
her signature on her letter on 4 August 1989.  LT Stewart is a member of the xxxxxx 
State Bar and is certified as trial and defense counsel of general courts-martial.” 

 
26. August 11, 1989.  The Applicant’s request was approved by Commandant (G-P). 
 
27. August  28,  1989.    DD-214.    The  Applicant  was  discharged  under  other  than 
honorable conditions from the Coast Guard with separation code KFS (for the good 
of the service).   

 
28. June  28,  2002.    The  Applicant’s  request  for  relief  in  this  matter  regarding  the 
character  and  reason  of  her  separation  was  denied  by  Coast  Guard  Discharge 
Review Board (DRB), convened under Title 10 United States Code, Section 1553 and 
Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 51 “to review the propriety and equity of 
the  applicant’s  discharge.”    In  a  unanimous  vote,  “after  a  thorough  review  of  the 
records,  supporting  documents,  facts  and  circumstances  unique  to  this  case”  the 
DRB  found  no  “basis  upon  which  to  grant  relief”  of  the  applicant’s  request  to  be 
medically discharged rather than receive an other than honorable discharge.  They 
referred the Applicant to the BCMR for consideration of the equity and propriety of 
her  separation  in  view  of  her  alleged  mental  condition  at  the  time  of  her  court 
martial.  

 
29. Per  Art  12-B-1e  of  PERSMAN  “Disability  statutes  do  not  preclude  disciplinary 
separation.    The  separations  described  here  supersede  disability  separation  or 
retirement.  If Commander, Coast Guard Personnel Command (CGPC) (CGPC-adm) 
is  processing  a  member  for  disability  while  simultaneously  Commander  (CGPC-
epm-1)  is  evaluating  him  or  her  for  an  involuntary  administrative  separation  for 
misconduct or disciplinary proceedings which could result in a punitive discharge 
or  an  unsuspended  punitive  discharge  is  pending,  Commander,  (CGPC-adm) 
suspends  the  disability  evaluation  and  Commander,  (CGPC-epm-1)  considers  the 
disciplinary action.  If the action taken does not include punitive or administrative 
discharge for misconduct, Commander, (CGPC-epm-1) sends or returns the case to 
Commander, (CGPC-adm) for processing.  If the action includes either a punitive or 
administrative discharge for misconduct, the medical board report shall be filed in 
the terminated member's medical personnel data record (MED PDR).”  

 
30. Per  paragraph  3.C.11  of  the  Physical  Disability  Evaluation  System  Manual, 
COMDTINST  M1850.2C,  the  identical  process  described  in  the  PERSMAN  is 
adhered to when a member is being reviewed for a disability while at the same time 
the subject of a disciplinary proceeding that could result in a punitive discharge. 

 
 
CONCLUSIONS: 
 
1.  The applicant’s basis for relief is that her medical condition, schizophrenia, was the 
reason for her misconduct for which she received a court martial, confinement and 
eventual discharge under other than honorable conditions.  The record indicates that 
the Applicant suffered from mental illness and the affects of substance abuse.  On 
June 16, 1987, a  sanity board of medical officers, convened in relation to the court 
martial  proceedings  against  applicant,  found  that  the  Applicant  was  able  to 
appreciate  the  nature  and  quality  of  wrongness  of  her  conduct.    Although  the 
Applicant may have been suffering from a mental illness at the time she committed 

the  offenses,  her  illness  did  not  prevent  her  from  knowing  that  her  behavior  was 
wrong.      Additionally,  the  board  found  that  the  applicant  had  sufficient  mental 
capacity to understand the nature of the proceedings (Special Court Martial) and to 
conduct or cooperate intelligently in her defense.  The Applicant offers no evidence 
to refute these findings, other than the finding of an earlier sanity board in May of 
1987  that  she  was  incompetent  to  stand  trial  and  her  current  mental  condition.  
However, both the May and June sanity board found that the Applicant was able to 
understand  the  wrongness  of  her  conduct  at  the  time  she  committed  the  criminal 
acts for which she was facing court martial. 

   
2.  The  record  indicates  that  in  May  1989,  the  original  sentence  was  set  aside  and  a 
retrial ordered due to a finding of a potential conflict of interest existing between the 
Applicant’s counsel and the government counsel.  The reasons for setting aside the 
findings  of  guilty  and  sentence  were  unrelated  to  the  determination  that  she  had 
been found competent to stand trial.  When retrial was  contemplated, the Applicant 
was  provided  new  legal  counsel,  for  which  the  Applicant  expressed  complete 
satisfaction.    The  Applicant  voluntarily  requested  and  accepted  a  discharge  under 
other than honorable conditions, in lieu of facing retrial.   

 
3.  Separation  proceedings  for  physical  disability  were  not  appropriate  in  the 
Applicant’s case. As set forth in the PERSMAN, “disability statutes do not preclude 
disciplinary  separations”.    Once  it  was  medically  determined  that  the  Applicant’s 
misconduct was not the result of her mental condition and that she was competent 
to stand trial, proceeding with disciplinary action was the correct course of action in 
this matter.  

 
4.  Applicant was afforded all the substantive and procedural rights to which she was 
entitled  in  her  court  martial  proceedings.    In  addition,    the  Coast  Guard  made 
noteworthy efforts to ensure that the Applicant’s mental condition was completely 
evaluated before court martial proceedings went forward.   

 
5.  No error or injustice committed.  While it is regrettable that the Applicant’s mental 
condition appears to have deteriorated since her separation from the Coast Guard, 
this is not a reasonable basis to question the findings made concerning her condition 
over 10 years ago, during the period 1987-1989. 

 
 
 
RECOMMENDATION: 
 
1.  I recommend that no relief be granted. 
 
2.  Applicant  should  be  encouraged  to  seek  continued  assistance  for  her  condition 

through other agencies, such as the Social Security Administration.